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NOTES
Liability of the Unconscious Driver
Today, liability of the insane driver for tortious conduct is no longer
an open question. In recent years, the great majority of courts have im-
posed liability upon the insane individual despite lack of moral blame.'
Certainly one would not deny that here we are imposing a form of strict
liability.2 In contrast to this responsibility, the courts, almost as one
voice, have held that the unconscious driver is to be excused for his in-
jury to the completely innocent plaintiff because it was "utterly without
his fault." This contrast rings a dissonant bell. Legal reasoning which
'Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894) (ship captain); Sforza v.
Green Bus Lines, 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934); Ieary v. Oates, 84 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); RESTATnMENT, TORTS § 283 (1948 Supp.); see Ellis
v. Fixico, 174 Okla. 116, 50 P.2d 162 (1935); Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118
So. 396 (1928) (dictum); ci. White v. White, 2 All E.R. 339 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
2"No statement has been found in any recent case decided on common law principles
which even suggests that an insane person should not be liable for harm uninten-
tionally inflicted by conduct which would be negligent in a normal adult...." RE-
STATEMENT, TORTs § 283 (1948 Supp.).
'Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir. 1933); Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy, 55
Cal. App. 2d 789, 131 P.2d 588 (1942); Soule v. Grimshaw, 266 Mich. 117, 253
N.W. 237 (1934); Lagasse v. LaPorte, 95 N.H. 92, 58 A.2d 312 (1948); Hatting-
ton v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P.2d 553 (1934); Lehman v.
Hayman, 164 Ohio St. 595, 133 N.E.2d 97 (1956); Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley,
81 Ohio App. 427, 76 N.E.2d 629 (1947); La Vigne v. La Vigne, 176 Ore. 634,
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excuses the unconscious driver for his injury to the plaintiff simply be-
cause it was "utterly without his fault," and at the same time holds
the lunatic liable, who is just as incapable of fault by the standards used,
is obviously illogical.
The great reluctance of the courts to hold the unconscious driver liable
can be attributed to a rebellion at any thought of an attack upon the
"citadel of fault.' 4 Before the industrial revolution, liability was imposed
without much regard to fault.5 The courts looked objectively to the
wrongfulness of the act, rather than the actor.6 The coming of the
Machine Age made it necessary to formulate new principals of tort law.7
Whereas prior to the industrial revolution, courts had said, "you are liable
because you have breached a pre-existing legal duty," with the advent of
that era they began to say, "you cannot be liable unless you have shown
a lack of due care."'8 However, liability without fault was not complete-
ly eradicated. It has persisted in the field of trover,9 trespass to land,1°
in nuisance cases," and cases in which the injury was caused by inherent-
ly dangerous instrumentalities.12  The following is a discussion which
will concern itself with a comparison of the liabilities of the insane mo-
torist and the unconscious one, the problems and policies involved and a
suggested solution.
THE INSANE MOTORIST
In 1948, the Restatement of Torts indicated that there was then suffi-
cient authority to enunciate a rule holding the insane person liable for
conduct which would be tortious on the part of a sane person.13 One of
158 P.2d 557 (1945); Driver v. Brooks, 176 Va. 317, 10 S.E.2d 887 (1940);
Dishman v. Whitney, 121 Wash. 157, 209 Pac. 12 (1922).
'James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE LU. 365
(1945-46).
522 MINN. L. REv. 853 (1938).
"Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARv. L. REV. 954 (1917-18); For a modern ex-
ample of this concept see United Electric Light Co. v. Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass.
313, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943), a case in which the court said that the nature of the
property had nothing to do with the concept that trespass inflicted absolute liability.7 Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. Rnv. 441
(1893-94).
'ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 32 (1941).
g22 MINN. L. REv. 863 (1938).
"
0 Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y.S. 726 (1937); 1
STREET, FOuNDATIONs OF LEGAL LIABILITY 19 (1906).
' Filtrol Corp. v. Hughes, 199 Miss. 10, 23 So.2d 891 (1945); Dixon v. New York
Trap Rock Corp. 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944).
1'For application of Rylands v. Fletcher in the U.S. see PROSSER, TORTS § 59 (2d
ed. 1955).
1 2RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283 (1948 Supp.).
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the cases which prompted the action of the Restatement was Sforza v.
Green Bus Lines.14 In that case, the defendant suddenly became insane
without any warning while operating a bus. The court said that it was
better that he or his estate bear the expense rather than the completely
innocent plaintiff.15
Most of our courts have used similar reasoning in forming a basis for
liability in these cases. These decisions reflect a glimmer of the pre-
industrial revolution concept that the basis of tortious liability should be
compensation for the injured rather than culpability of the defendant.
Another reason advanced is that public policy requires the enforcement
of the liability in order that the relatives may be under an inducement to
restrain him.1 6  Some of the later cases imposed liability on the ground
that tortfeasors, if allowed this defense, might simulate or pretend in-
sanity to obscure what actually were wrongful acts on their part.17 A
reason somewhat related to this has been suggested by Dean Prosser, al-
though it is unexpressed in the cases. He suggests that the decisions in
this area may be the result of a fear on the part of the courts of intro-
ducing into tort law the confusing and unsatisfactory tests attending the
proof of insanity in criminal cases.' 8 The courts ignore the anomaly in
this situation and state simply: "The reason is because he that is damaged
ought to be recompensed. '19
THE UNCONSCIOUS DRIVER
As pointed out previously, the almost unanimous holding in the
United States is that without anticipatory warning, the sleeping, uncon-
scious or epileptic driver is not liable for his tortious conduct2 0 The
courts have had notably little difficulty here since they apply the general
rule that liability for unintentionally causing a physical injury can only
be predicated upon a failure to live up to a social standard of due care.2 l
x, 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934).
Id. at 182, 268 N.Y.S. at 448.
"Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 Pac. 348 (1927); Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y.
442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894); see Brinck v. Bradbury, 179 Cal. 376, 176 Pac. 690
(1918).
"T McIntyre v. Shoy, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239 (1887); Sforza v. Green Bus Lines,
150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (1934); see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Francisco,
149 Ky. 307, 148 S.W. 46 (1912).
" PRossER, TORTS § 108 (1941).
"Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 NX.E. 449 (1894); 1 COOLEY, TORTS S 65
(4th ed. 1932).
" Cases cited note 3 supra, For an excellent annotation on this subject containing
most of the cases see 28 A.L.R.2d 1 (1953).
'Bohlen, Torts of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924).
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A typical factual situation is presented by the leading case of Slattery v.
Haley.2 The defendant, while driving his auto along a city street, sud-
denly was taken ill and rendered unconscious without any preliminary
symptoms or warning. His car, without the guidance of a driver, ran up-
on the sidewalk and fatally injured a young boy. Plaintiff argued the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher 3 and also "that as between two innocent
parties, plaintiff is the least guilty." The defendant escaped liability on
the grounds that the act was not the conscious act of his volition and that
such risks were assumed by the plaintiff as a necessary part of daily liv-
ing. Subsequent American decisions have emphatically endorsed this rea-
soning.
The above doctrine leaves the plaintiff with the burden of proving
fault on the part of the defendant under circumstances in which proof is
virtually inaccessible to him. Ostensibly, courts alleviate the difficulty by
shifting the burden of going forward to the defendant. The courts have
held that the mere fact that the accident occurred in the manner in which
it did will result in an inference,24 presumption 25 or prima facie case 26
arising in plaintiff's favor. However, courts have been exceedingly gen-
erous with the defendant and in many instances have held that virtually
any evidence at all will rebut the presumption. In some cases the pre-
sumption has been overcome solely by an assertion on the part of the de-
fendant that he felt fine just prior to the collision. 27 A few courts have
gone to an even greater extreme and stated that if the defendant testifies
that he lost consciousness and the plaintiff fails to present any rebutting
evidence, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict.28 A recent case
held that knowledge on the part of the defendant that he suffered at least
one black-out a month was, as a matter of law, not gross negligence.29
'52 Ont. L.R. 95, 3 D.L.R. 156 (1922).
=L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
'Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal.2d 439, 122 P.2d 53 (1942); Gendron v. Gendron,
144 Me. 347, 69 A.2d 668 (1949); Journey v. Zawish, 11 N.J. Misc. 482, 167 AtL
7 (1933).
'Meyers v. Tri-State Auto Co., 121 Minn. 68, 140 N.W. 184 (1913); Weldon
Tool Co. v. Kelley, 81 Ohio App. 427, 76 N.E.2d 629 (1947); accord Waters v.
Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc., 55 Cal.App. 2d 789, 131 P.2d 588 (1942); Soule v. Grim-
shaw, 266 Mich. 117, 253 N.W. 237 (1934).
'Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P.2d 553 (1934);
Keller v. Wonn, 140 W.Va. 860,87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
'Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 41 Del. 336, 21 A.2d 286 (1941); Covington
v. Carley, 197 Miss. 535, 19 So.2d 817 (1944); see Collins v. McClure, 143 Ohio
Sr. 567, 56 N.E.2d 171 (1944).
'Armstrong v. Cook, 250 Mich. 180, 229 N.W. 433 (1930); see Lagasse v. LaPorte,
95 N.H. 92, 58 A.2d 312 (1948).
" Espeland v. Green, 74 S.D. 484, 54 N.W.2d 465 (1952).
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Thus, the real burden is on the plaintiff and he must establish his case
by a preponderance of the evidence.
It appears inevitable that the courts, by the present standards, have
allowed many blameworthy drivers to escape liability.30 The availability
of unconsciousness as a valid defense is undoubtedly a reason for the in-
crease in this class of cases in recent years.3 ' Although many courts have
imposed greater burdens upon the defendant, the plaintiff's problem of
proof is still prodigious and an unfavorable result is a distinct likelihood.
It seems inconceivable that the condition of the defendant at the time of
the accident could be determined upon a subsequent medical examina-
tion. The driver himself may be unable to disclose what actually did oc-
cur; he "may remember driving along, lights flickering, and waking up in
the hospital" 32  Often, the effect of the impact upon the driver will ren-
der his testimony even less reliable. It appears unjust to allow a com-
pletely innocent plaintiff to go without remedy simply because a defend-
ant who has occasioned the loss has created a situation whereby the plain-
tiff is deprived of any means of proving his right to compensation.
Much of the reasoning behind the majority of American cases in the
unconscious area can be attributed to a misapplication of the leading au-
thority in this field. In Slattery v. Haley33 the court was obsessed with
the idea that there could be no liability without fault and limited itself to
predicating responsibility either upon a willful act or a negligent one.3 4
The opinion dearly expressed displeasure with a trend which indicated
that the insane were being held liable for their torts. Desiring to reverse
this trend because of the absence of fault, the court overlooked all of the
policy reasons involved. A rather recent court of appeals case in Canada
bears out this position.3 5 In this case, the driver suddenly suffered a de-
lusion that his vehicle was under the remote control of his employer.
The court, following Slattery v. Haley, ruled that insane persons were not
liable for their torts. These cases involve an automatic application of
the "no liability without fault" concept and fail to consider upon whom
the risk of loss should fallas
" 'We are sure that the availability of non-culpable sleep as a defense has swelled
the case load." Kaufman and Kantrowitz, The Case of the Sleeping Motorist, 25
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362 (1950).
''We have found one reported decision considering the liability of the unconscious
driver from 1900 to 1919, seven from 1920 through 1929, forty-nine from 1930
through 1939, and forty from 1940 to 1949." Ibid.
'Appleman, Sleeping at the Wheel, 22 IOWA L REV. 525, 530 (1937).
=52 Ont. L.R. 95, 3 D.L.R. 156 (1922).
£ Id. at 99, 3 D.L.R. at 158.
nBuckley & Toronto Transp. Comm'n v. Smith Transp. Ltd., Ont. 798 (1946), 4
D.L.R. 721 (1946).
' See 6 U. Prrr. L. REv. 308 (1940).
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A small minority have held the unconscious driver liable for the plain-
tiff's injuries. These courts have reasoned that since the insane driver
would be liable under similar circumstances, there is no valid reason for
exempting the unconscious driver from liability. A Texas case" involved
a defendant who had fainted without any warning, his car crossed to the
opposite side of the road, collided with plaintiff's car and caused plaintiff
injury. The court held that even if the defendant had been suddenly ren-
dered unconscious without any negligence on his part he would still be
liable. A Georgia case38 involved a suit for compensatory damages for
injuries incurred when defendant committed an assault and battery upon
the plaintiff during an epileptic seizure. The court drew the very rele-
vant analogy to an insane person in holding defendant liable. The court
went on to say that, "It is dearly agreed that, if one who wants discre-
tion commits a trespass against the person or possessions of another, he
shall be compelled in a civil action to give satisfaction for the damage."39
In 1948, the Restatement cited the Texas case as a persuasive factor in
the decision that there was then sufficient authority to hold the insane
liable.
It should be noted that the same rationale which sustains holding the
driver liable who suddenly becomes insane, can also be applied to the un-
conscious driver. Certainly it will be conceded that in this situation the
plaintiff did not occasion the loss. Furthermore, since courts hold insane
persons liable for fear that if they allow them to escape responsibility
many will feign insanity, a fortiori they should hold the unconscious
liable, since it is much easier to simulate this particular mental incapacity.
An even more compelling reason is the virtually insurmountable task of
proving defendant's culpability which is put upon the plaintiff.
INSANITY RULE APPLIED TO THE UNCONSCIOUS DRIVER
Liability of the unconscious driver can be predicated upon various
concepts, none of which are meant to imply that there should be absolute
liability in all motor-collision cases.40 Two analogous areas in addition
to the insanity rule support this liability. Some writers would impose
liability on the theory that an ultrahazardous activity is here involved.
'Leary v. Oates, 84 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
SSauers v. Sack, 34 Ga. App. 748, 131 S.E. 98 (1925).
'Id. at 749, 131 S.E. at 99.
...... [Us the motor-car to be placed in the list of things dangerous in themselves
and be classified in the future in law within the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher?
The answer to that is 'yes' and it is a fact which is overdue for recognition." W.J
Sim, The Principle of Absolute Liability in Motor-Collision Cases, 14 N.Z.L.J. 124,
125 (1938).
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There are in use today few instrumentalities so fraught with danger to
life as an automobile on a busy highway without the guidance of a driver.
The dangerous "activity" here is "not that of. driving ... but that of re-
maining constantly capable of driving."' 1 This is a necessary delimitation
since if we were to say that "driving" is the dangerous activity we would
impose absolute liability in all cases and it appears that our negligence
law would prohibit any such far-reaching change at the present time.
Another analogy is that existing between a wild animal and the mod-
ern automobile. If the owner of a vicious dog allows him to escape from
his leash, he is held absolutely liable for any damage done, regardless of
how innocent the owner's conduct may have been.42  The basis of liabil-
ity here is said to be the possession and control of the animal.43 In the
case of animals mansuete naturae, injury which results from a dangerous
propensity in the animal which was known to the keeper will result in
absolute liability.4 ' The driver of an automobile knows that if he loses
control, the heretofore "domesticated" engine becomes a "wild" one, like-
ly to do considerable harm.
CONCLUSION
An extension of liability to the unconscious driver would not be re-
pugnant to our tort law. The great reluctance to impose liability in this
situation can be attributed to those who would make all liability in tort
depend on blameworthiness. "The courts came to feel that the negligence
concept was a universal concept permeating all tort law."'45 Indeed, Jus-
tice Field, in The Nitroglycerine Case'0 said, "No case or principal can
be found... subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without
fault on his parr. '47  But the fault doctrine is an illusion. "It may be
questioned whether 'fault,' with its popular connotation of personal guilt
and moral blame, and its ...arbitrary legal meaning, which will vary
with the requirements of social conduct imposed by the law, is of any
real assistance .... except perhaps as a descriptive term."48  Granted that
in these situations the defendant is guilty of no "legal fault." But his
action has harmed someone and the question remains whether justice to
'Kaufman and Kantrowitz, supra note 30, at 368.
'Perkins v. Drury, 57 N.M. 269, 258 P.2d 379 (1953); see McNeely, A Footnote
on Dangerous Animals, 37 MIC. L. RaV. 1181 (1939).
"PRossER, TORTS § 57 (2d ed. 1955).
"MCNE LY, supra note 42.
rELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMs 32 (1941).
"Parrott v. Wells, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524 (1872).
' Id. at 539.
"sPRossEa, ToRTs § 56 (2d ed. 1955).
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